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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The appellants (collectively the "State11 unless othervise indicated) issued an audit of State Coal Lease No* ML-25005
(the "State Lease") to the respondents (collectively "Consol"
unless otherwise
unpaid

indicated) and demanded

royalties*

Consol protested

payment

of

alleged

to the Director of the

Division of State Lands and Forestry (the "Director") who upheld
the audit.

Consol filed a complaint for declaratory judgment

against the State challenging the audit*

This appeal is brought

by the State from the District Court's Memorandum Decision and
Declaratory Judgment granting summary judgment for Consol.

The

Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal

under

Utah

Code

sections

78-2-2(3)(e)(iii)

and

78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented for review on this appeal are as
follows:
1*

Did the District Court properly

find that the

State and Consol entered into an agreement for the payment of
lease royalties at the rate of 17** cents per ton.

1

In accord with Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, Consol includes its own statement of issues.

-1-

2.

Did

the District

Court

properly

find

that

the

royalty provision of the State Lease is ambiguous as a matter of
law.
3.

Did

royalty provision

the

District

Court

properly

construe

the

in light of the parties' course of conduct

interpreting the royalty rate to be 17h cents per ton*
4.

Did the District Court properly conclude that the

royalty provision is not self-executing but would require affirmative action on the part of the State to increase the royalty
rate above 17H cents per ton.
5.
acted

Did the District Court properly

find the State

in its proprietary capacity with regard to leasing the

state lands involved in this case.
6.

Did the District Court properly conclude, on an

alternate basis, that the State is estopped as a matter of law
from demanding

royalty payments from Consol

in excess of 17%

cents per ton.
7.

Did the District

Court

properly

conclude,

that

even if the State were acting in its governmental capacity, it
still would be estopped from asserting a royalty rate other than
nh

cents per ton.
8.

Did the District Court properly consider the law

regarding school trust lands.

-2-

9.

Is the State's new royalty policy a rule vhich is

invalid because of the State's failure to follow the provisions
of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
10.

Did

the District Court properly find that the

State had no right under the State Lease to impose interest.
11.

Does an arbitrary and capricious standard apply in

this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

lawsuit

centers on

the

State's

claim

against

Consol for royalties alleged to be due under the State Lease for
the period of July 1, 1979 to December 31, 1984 (the "Audit
Period") and for the subsequent periods of time to the end of the
term of the State Lease on January 23, 1988.

The State Lease,

entered into on January 23, 1968, provides that a royalty is to
be paid to the State of Utah at the rate of 15 cents per ton or
the rate prevailing for coal leases on federal land of similar

2

The State's Statement of the Case, and its entire Brief, is
riddled with assertions of fact without references to the Record,
as required by Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 24(a)(7),
and which are in fact unsupported by the Record. Appendix "A" is
a list of such unsupported assertions. The Court has held that
if the appellant fails to provide adequate citations to the record, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct.
Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987). Furthermore, the information contained in footnote 1 of the State's
Brief is not part of the Record and cannot be used to support the
State's argument.
-3-

character, whichever is higher (R. 145-46, 587).

The Minutes of

the Board of State Lands and Forestry (the "Board") indicate that
the State Lease was approved by the Board at a royalty rate of 15
cents per ton (R. 145, 348, 473).
In 1978, the Division of State Lands and Forestry (the
"Division") represented to Consol that Consol could not commence
mining under the State Lease until an agreement had been reached
on the royalty provision because the provision was considered by
the Division to be ambiguous

(R. 146-47, 587).

Later in 1978,

Consol and the Division agreed that the royalty rate would be 15
cents per ton, the same royalty rate under Consol's Federal Coal
Lease No. U-5287 (the "Federal Lease") (R. 147, 587).

Both the

State

proposed

Lease

and

the

Federal

Lease

were

included

mining plans for Consol's Emery Mine located

in

in Emery County,

Utah (R. 147, 150, 473).

3

Article III, Paragraph 2 of the State Lease provides that a
production royalty would be paid:
(a) at the rate of 15£ per ton of 2000 lbs.
of coal produced from the leased premises and
sold or otherwise disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning
of the quarter for which payment is being
made, for federal lessees of land of similar
character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher

-4-

The State Lease was not mined until 1981 (R. 147, 588).
In mid-1981, Consol

informed the Division of

its intent to

commence mining under the State Lease and reached an agreement
with the Division that the rate payable under the royalty provision was 17% cents per ton, the amount then required to be paid
under Consol's Federal Lease (R. 147-48, 348, 475, 588).
During the periods when Consol mined under the State
Lease, from September, 1981 to June, 1983 and from February, 1985
through January, 1988, Consol paid royalties at the rate of 17%
cents per ton on a quarterly basis and submitted quarterly
royalty settlement statements to the Division, which statements
clearly reflect that Consol was paying royalties at that rate.
The Division accepted each such royalty payment and statement,
with no suggestion until October 15, 1985 that any rate other
than the agreed upon 17% cents per ton rate was applicable (R.
149-50, 349, 474, 588-89).
In an October 15, 1985 letter to Consol, the State
announced a new policy relating to coal royalties.

The State

asserted that under subparagraph (b) of the royalty provision
(the "prevailing federal rate clause19), see supra. p. 4 n. 3,
royalties for the Audit Period were due at the rate of 8% of the
value of coal mined.

According to the State, under the Federal

Coal Lease Amendments Act of 1976 ("FCLAA"), and the regulations
promulgated thereunder, the prevailing rate during the Audit
Period for all underground federal coal mining operations was 8%
-5-

of the coal value.

The State demanded payment of $126,981.88 for

alleged royalty underpayment during the Audit Period, $70,211.21
for accrued interest until the date of the audit and additional
accrued interest after the audit (R. 150, 589).
The parties filed cross motions for partial summary
judgment.

The District Court granted Consol's Motion and denied

the State's Motion (R. 593).

The State filed this appeal.

By Order of the Court dated September 19, 1988, this
appeal was consolidated with three other appeals.

Consol's case,

however, has an important distinction: it is the only case in
which the State and lessee reached an agreement on the interpretation of the prevailing federal rate clause.

This agreement is

an important distinction in Consol's arguments regarding contract
construction and estoppel.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Each argument numbered 1 through 4 below is made in the
alternative

because

each

provides

an

independent

basis

for

upholding the District Court's decision.
1.

The parties reached an agreement

in 1981 before

mining commenced, as required by the State, that the royalty rate

4

Consol's and the State's Motions were partial because they did
not include the issue of whether Consol underreported production
during the Audit Period. This issue was resolved by the parties
by Stipulation filed with the District Court prior to entry of
the Declaratory Judgment (R. 618-20). Consol conceded this issue
because it involved only $243.15, which was not an amount sufficient to warrant litigation.

-6-

payable under the State Lease was 17% cents per ton.

The par-

ties' agreement at 17% cents per ton cannot be increased to 8%
unilaterally by the State.
2.

The prevailing federal rate clause is ambiguous on

its face because it is susceptible to numerous possible interpretations.

parties9

The

agreement

and

course

of

performance

indicates that they interpreted the prevailing federal rate to be
17% cents per ton.
3.

The

self-executing.

prevailing

federal

rate

clause

is

not

Consol had no duty to pay royalties under the

prevailing federal rate clause at a rate higher than 17% cents
per ton unless and until there was an agreement between the State
and Consol or a proper rulemaking by the State.
3.

The State is estopped from attempting to retroac-

tively invoke the prevailing federal rate clause and from denying
the agreement at 17% cents per ton.

In electing to mine coal

from the State Lease, Consol relied on the State9s acceptance of
17% cents per ton without objection and the parties9 agreement
that the royalty rate was 17% cents per ton.

If the State is

allowed to repudiate its long-standing practice and retroactively
apply a different interpretation of the prevailing federal rate
clause, Consol will suffer great financial injury.
4.

The status of lands involved as school trust lands

does not alter the agreement between the parties or preclude
estoppel against the State.

Utah law does not require that the
-7-

State receive more than 17% cents per ton for coal mined from
school trust lands*

The State satisfied any trust responsibility

it may have had.
5.

Because it has general applicability, the State's

new royalty policy is a rule which, absent compliance with the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, is invalid and may not be
applied prospectively, much less retrospectively.
6.

The State's attempt to apply its interest rule,

which was promulgated after the parties entered into the State
Lease, is contrary to the express terms of the lease and therefore

invalid.

Alternatively,

the State

is not

entitled

to

interest prior to its first demand for payment of the alleged
deficient royalties.
7.

The State is not entitled to summary judgment that

8% of gross sales value

is the applicable royalty under the

prevailing

clause

federal

rate

because

there

are

issues of

material fact that must be resolved before such a determination
can be made.

If this Court holds against Consol on arguments 1-6

above, a trial would be necessary to determine the applicable
royalty rate under the prevailing federal rate clause.

-8-

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY POUND THAT PLATEAU HAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED
ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND THE LAW.
K.

The District Court Properly Found that
the State and Consol Entered Into an
Agreement for Payment of Lease Royalties
at the Rate of 17% Cents Per Ton.

Consol originally planned to mine the coal subject to
the State Lease in 1978.

In anticipation of mining, Consol

telephoned the Division for its interpretation of the royalty
provision in June 1978.

John Blake, Mineral Specialist for the

Division, advised Ronald Hughes, who was then the mine manager
for Consol, that because the royalty provision was ambiguous,
Consol could not commence mining until an agreement was reached
to clarify the royalty rate (R. 147).

In August 1978, Frank

Lokash, another employee of Consol at that time, reached an
agreement with Mr. Blake and Donald Prince, Assistant Director of
the Division, that the royalty rate would be 15 cents per ton,
the same rate payable under Consol*s Federal Lease, which is the
only federal coal lease within the boundaries of the mining plans
for the Emery Mine (R. 147, 348, 473). Consol did not commence
mining until 1981.

Prior to commencing mining in 1981, Hughes

•gain telephoned Blake to confirm their agreement on the royalty
rate.

The parties again agreed that the royalty rate for the

State Lease would be the same as the royalty rate payable under
Consolvs Federal Lease, which at that time was 17*1 cents per ton.

-9-

Hughes confirmed the agreement by letter to Blake,

(R. 147-48,

348, 474). In Blake's responsive letter, he noted that the lease
was subject to readjustment at the end of its twenty year term in
1988*

The royalty rate payable under the Federal Lease was 17%

cents for the entire period of the lease.

In sum, the parties

resolved the ambiguity by agreeing that the prevailing federal
rate was 17% cents per ton at least until the end of the lease
term in January, 1988.
Based on these uncontroverted facts, the District Court
found that the parties entered into an agreement in 1978 that the
royalty rate would be 15 cents per ton (R. 587).
mining was done under that royalty rate.

However, no

Prior to mining the

State Lease, the parties entered into another agreement in 1981
that the royalty rate would be 17% cents per ton until readjustment at the end of the 20 year term in January, 1988 (R. 588).
The State contends that the District Court's ruling
upholding the agreement was tantamount to rewriting the Lease and
that

the

Lease

cannot

be

rewritten

without

Director, the Board or the Attorney General.

approval

of the

The statutes cited

by the State do not in any way indicate that the Director, the
Board or the Attorney General have exclusive authority to speak
for the Division.

The Board is granted policy making authority

over state lands.

Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-1 (1986) (repealed by

Trust Land Management Act, 1988 Utah Laws Ch. 121, effective July
1, 1988).

The authority to administer state leases is vested in
-10-

the Division,

id. S 65-1-2.1 (repealed July 1, 1988).

Applying

the royalty provision of a mineral lease is an administrative
function.

Further, the Director cannot personally administer all

of the State's mineral leases.

This function was, in effect,

delegated to the Director's staff.

At no time did Blake, Prince

or any other official of the Division suggest to Consol that
Blake or Prince did not have authority to reach such an agreement
or interpretation.

Moreover, Consol finds it perplexing that the

State asserts that Blake and Prince did not have authority to
enter into an agreement with Consol when Blake and Prince signed
the State's Answers to Consol's First Set of Interrogatories as
"officers and agents of the respective Defendant agencies" (R.
81-82).
As set forth in Point E of this Memorandum, the State
is estopped from asserting that there was not an agreement.
Furthermore, the State cannot unilaterally revise the agreement
as it now seeks to do.

Regardless, however, of whether an

agreement existed, the parties established a course of conduct of
payment and receipt without objection of royalties at the rate of
nh

cents per ton, and such course of conduct governs as set

forth in Point C of this Memorandum.
B.

The District Court Properly Found the
Royalty Provision to be Ambiguous.

The State asserts that the District Court held that the
royalty provision

is ambiguous "because the escalator clause

-11-

required plaintiffs to determine the prevailing rate from facts
outside the lease."
misstatement
District
because

Appellants' Brief at 20.

of the District Court's Memorandum Decision.

Court
it

found

the

royalty

to

be

The

ambiguous

interpretations

The law supports this conclusion that the royalty

provision of the State Lease
it

provision

is susceptible of several different

(R. 589-90).

because

This is a gross

is

interpretations.

susceptible

is ambiguous

of

many

as a matter of law

varying

and

inconsistent

See Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376

P.2d 548 (1962).
Several phrases of the prevailing federal rate clause
of the royalty provision are ambiguous.

The meaning of "land of

a similar character" is unclear and could be construed to have
several different meanings.

Nor

is it clear what

is meant by

"coal leases issued by the United States at that time."
the phrase "at that time" creates uncertainty.
not clear what is meant by "rate prevailing."
ing mean?

More than fifty percent?

Use of

Finally, it is
What does prevail-

What if the breakdown for

lease rates was 33 1/3% at 15 cents per ton, 33 1/3% at 17^ cents
per ton and 33 1/3% at 8%?

Was it the lessee's duty to obtain

current lease rates from the United States Bureau of Land Management

("BLM") each quarter?

considered?

What

geographical

area was

to be

Some of the numerous possible interpretations of the

various terms in the prevailing federal rate clause are listed in
the chart

attached

hereto

as Appendix
-12-

"B".

When

the various

il in i berpretat
there ar*

l JI

• c f bh e I i: ej p h r a s e r i ii I hi:least 972 distinct interpretation

-*•
i 11 t»
i clause

The underground royalty rates fci federal coa

nip,

*«s

in Utah that were ii i effect: during the Audit Period varied from
Il .- • II 2. 50 il • i Il '

^d era!

leases during the same time per. u across the nat

he same

range of royalty rates (R. 469)

he most

to determii

survey all currently issued federal coal leases either
Utah State Office

the Washinqton office

* '"

survey

tftese lease
coal leases
H ove v e i

ei

«a

effect during the Audit Period
*

469* <.

h a d g a t h e r e d t h ii s 1 i i format :i o

h a v e b e e n i m p o s s i b l e f o r C o n s o l I (> d e t e r m i n e t h e prev
b e c a u s e o f t h e a m b i g u i t i e s iiitt t h e p r e v a i l i n g f e d e r a l r a t e c l a u s e .
am 1
provision does not have a plain meaning as the State asserts.
Furthermore, if the provision has only one meaning and is

1

As set forth in Appendix "B", there are four phrases in the
clause that are each susceptible of numerous interpretations.
Using mathematics, the number of interpretations of the entire
clause is equivalent to (1te number of combinations of the different interpretations c I: each phrase, which Is 972 di stinct
combinations.

i.

five producing
interpreted

state

the

coal

provision

leases with similar
according

to

the

royalty

clauses

State's

reading

(R. 153-54, 349, 475)?
The State asserts that the prevailing rate clause is an
escalator clause or "favored nation" clause and that escalator
clauses are not ambiguous "if there is a formula or method to set
the price."
ignores
method

Appellants' Brief

the
to

fact
set

that

the

there

at 20-21.

is not

prevailing

royalty

However, the State

an objective
because

the

formula

or

prevailing

federal rate clause is susceptible of so many different interpretations.

The cases cited by the State for the proposition that

courts uphold

favored

nation

clauses

involve clauses that

are

unambiguous.
The State's own officers and employees have acknowledged that the royalty provision is ambiguous.

In addition, the

Division has demonstrated that the royalty provision is ambiguous
by itself adopting different interpretations.
Division

interpreted

the

prevailing

federal

Prior to 1985, the
rate

clause

to

include only those federal leases that were producing in the same

6

The following officers and employees of the Division
acknowledged during discovery in Trail Mountain Coal Company v.
The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, Case No. 880300,
that the royalty provision is ambiguous: Ralph A. Miles, Director of the Division; Donald G. Prince, Assistant Director of the
Division; and John Thomas Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist
with the Division.
See Brief of Respondent Trail Mountain Coal
Company at 10-11.
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area.

The Division was not ci,ro ~

a

«*«;«*. ^

;*«,<* * « * *

but would have recommended to the Board tha
J
now interprets the royalty provision in this case to have another
meaning:
ill

||||i iiii I

the State now views the royalty rate I 11 be 8%, relying
11 11

11 II III II 11

within the State

I11*1 "ii1'I 1 Il 1 1 1 1 111 II 1 1 1 1 i 11 II mi- i 1 1 1

1 "i

Utah since January 1979, 1egardless

whether such leases are in production.
The royalty provision mystified other agencies c, f I he
state

Legislative Auditc

eneral requested

opinio! 11
meaning

character" within the context

the royalty provisior

result

Legislat:

General Counsel

Of 'ii in 1 ii c 1 1

ciently vague
ings.

definition" becaus

numerous mean-

(R. -5-d U C 4L1KI
I

clause

*

capable

numerous meanings an

erpretations.

Thus, the royalty provision is ambiguous as a mattei 1
C

The District court Did Mot Kevnte the
Lease; It Properly Construed the Royalty
Provision ^ i 11 , Light of the Parties9
Agreement and Course of Performance
Interpreting the Royalty Rate to be 1 7%
Cents Per Ton,

The S t a t e

contend s 111111111

MM

IMJUIII

|i |un > 1 A 11111111111 m 11 m 1 \

provides that the applicable federal royalty rate cluring the

Audit Period was 8% and that the District Court thus erred in
construing
agreement

the
and

royalty
course

of

provision

according

to

the

conduct.

The State presents

parties'
general

rules of contract construction in support of its interpretation.
See Appellants1

Brief at 23.

Many of the State's cases do not

stand for the rule of construction for which they are cited.
Further, the State totally ignores the rule of construction that
the courts look to the interpretation of the parties by their
course of conduct to construe ambiguous contracts (the rule of
practical construction).

Zeese v. Estate of Sieqelf 534 P.2d 85

(Utah 1975).
Contrary
did not

rewrite

to the State's position, the District Court

the contract;

course of conduct.

it simply

followed the parties'

The parties' course of performance indicates

that they interpreted the royalty provision of the State Lease to
mean that the royalty rate was 17^ cents per ton.

7

Throughout the

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981),
does not hold that "the intent of the parties when entering into
the contract controls the meaning of the contract." Appellants'
Brief at 22. Naqle v. Club Fontainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d
346, 348 (1965), holds that "[w]here the intent and purpose can
be ascertained, it should be enforced in accordance with its substance."
Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d
743, 749 (Utah 1982), holds that "[t]his Court will not rewrite a
contract to supply terms which the parties omitted," and that
"the first source of inquiry must be the document itself, considered in its entirety." The holding in Public Service Co. v. City
and County of Denver, 153 Colo. 396, 387 P.2d 33, 36 (1963), that
a contract must be construed liberally to protect the public
interest, is limited to public utility franchise agreements.
-16-

entire Audit Per

hereafter through i in

terir

royalty

ubmitted

payments

I'IIHJI

nui i linn 11. •

accompanied

by

smittals which

coal

clea?

reflected that payments were made
ton.

*y<* *

The Division never objected to the amount

payments ::: i I: 1: >e • r o y a l t y i a I: .• is • :i :i it i Il 1 t , :i ssi
The State's assertion that the intent
eceipt
highest royalty rate pai
by the Record.

market value

aaeraj.

See Appellants' Briei

and 24.
*

part ei

course

performance

vi

Furth^

intent,

f

mtrary to

should be enforced by the Court

stated by the Utah Supreme
dicater

common sense concept that

,ons> >pr

Bui lough

i

Crestview Cemetarv A„»- _
Eve^ "r

s

be clear on *u»
ing

2d 20, 23 (19

;uorng

. Diedei
were to view the royalty provision to
-ontract should

interpreted accord-

the parties"1 court

performance is contrary

wordinc

contract.

St. Bei iedict"""s Hospita

J A-L^U \Utah 1981).

Eie v.

This rul*

based on the reasoning that the course of performance
ambiguity and that a court should not enforce the wording of

contract when the parties have demonstrated

that they intended

the contract to have a different meaning.
In this case, Consol paid royalties at the rate of 17%
cents per ton, a rate which was clearly reflected on the coal
production and settlement transmittals submitted during the Audit
Period and thereafter until the end of the lease term in January,
1988.

The State accepted each payment without objection up to

the time it issued the audit report.

By these actions of Consol

and the acquiescence of the State, the royalty clause as a matter
of law required the royalty to be paid at the rate of 17% cents
per ton.
D.

The District Court Properly Found the
Royalty Provision Not To Be Self-Executing.

The State views the prevailing federal rate provision
to be self-executing.

In other words, the State believes that

Consolfs

royalty

federal
cents

duty

to make

payments

under

rate" clause arose as soon as that

per

ton,

without

However, the prevailing

any

action

the

"prevailing

rate exceeded 17%

whatsoever

by

the

State.

federal rate clause cannot possibly be

self-executing when its meaning is not clear on its face.

The

District

the

Court

found

that

in order

to be

self-executing

prevailing rate would have to be an identifiable fact which could
be

independently

prevailing

federal

ascertained

by

rate clause

either

party

(R.

is not tied to an

590).

The

identifiable

fact or an objective market standard, and thus it can only be
-18-

construed as an open price provision under which the royalty rate
f

then through appropriate policy-making

rule-making procedures

as discussed in Point G of this Memorandum.
anguag
rate clause dictate tha

: cannot be self-executing, the facts

indicate that the part
self-executing

not 1 ntend the provisio

The Board Minutes approving the issuance ot

State Lease at the royalty rate J1 lb cents per ton indicate that
i

parties tha

cents
federa

l

» 11

5

parties agreed to a higher prevailing
<••

State gave Conso] rioti ce and made • a

f

fe

the State never stated

that

self -execut ing and never stated that

::! is u: a l l

i a t ' s •.

IF " :i ,:i tfc .ex ITIIJ :: » i e ,

I iieved the provision as
ii t expected Conso]

tc

contrary, the State in 1978 advised Consol that it was necessary
that it reach an agreement
before ni i i:i i ig cou] d begin,
rate was nh

\ ii till: i the • State c i it t h B I : j a] tj i a I: B
ii i J 98] , the parties agreed that the

cents per ton.

the conduct of the parties show that the clause was not applicable absent

agreemen*

agreement, or alternatively, notice and a proper

equir ing royal t y payments
-19-

lis i

Ill i '3 i cents per ton.

Because Consol paid 17^ cents per ton, it complied with the clear
terms of the State Lease and owes no additional royalties to the
State.
E.

The District Court Properly Applied the
Doctrine of Estoppel Against the State.

If the Court finds that the parties did not agree that
the royalty rate under the State Lease was 17% cents per ton, and
if the Court further

finds that the prevailing

federal rate

provision is self-executing, the District Court's judgment should
still be affirmed because the District Court found alternatively
that the State is estopped from demanding payment of a royalty
based on 8% of value (R. 591).
1.

Equitable Estoppel Applies Against the State —

In

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689
(Utah 1979), the Court held that equitable estoppel would apply
against the State, but that greater caution must be applied when
the State is acting in its governmental as opposed to proprietary
capacity.

Ld. at 694 (quoting Metropolitan Park Dist. v. State

Dept. of Natural
(1975)).

Resources, 85 Wash. 2d 821, 539 P.2d

854

Equitable estoppel may be applied against the State,

even when it is acting in a governmental capacity "if necessary
to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of governmental
powers will not be impaired as a result."

Id. (quoting West v.

Dept. of Social and Health Servs., 21 Wash. App. 577, 586 P.2d
516, 518 (1978).

In Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d

-20-

estoppel should not

applied against the State.

But when

•plainly apparent" that th* application : f thi s i JLII! B #ould resuxL
in injustice, and there would be ' " 'i i ::: substantial adverse effect
Id.

on public policy," the doctrine applies against tl me State.
• ,." 3 Il 8
°

The State Acts

in a Proprietary Capacity

When

Leasing State Lands and is Estopped under the Undisputed Facts of

proprietary

capacities,

Metropolitan Park Dist. v
(1975)

the

court

Celebrity

Club, c

State, 85 Wash. 2d 621 , 539 P.2d 854

where the Washington Supreme Court held that the state :: £

Wash i ng t on was es topped f r om cancel 1 i ng a use deed f o i s t a t

held that "when the State undertakes ILL dispose of public lands,
either by lease or sriillf;1
i 1:j ' ' I d

a I: 1958.

ill illnpi ael?1. in its proprietary capac-

Il IIIi M o m a n v. B 0 a r c j u i state Lauds ,

695 (Utah 1976), the court held that estoppel would apply agar
the Board, but found that the basic elements cf estoppel ver*thi-

ill iii!11 i1! i-! in in 1

Maughan expresses a view consistent vith majority opinio;
the State acts to dispose of public lands,

lease

,uua

acts il mi: i its proprietary capacity ai icl equitable estoppel
proper remedy•" Id. at 700.

Thus, 11

District Court prope:

concl uded tha 1: , tl: , si! • St .ill! A is • i siii; is ,' ::: ti i icj
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« *

when

it

issued

and

administered

the

State

Lease

(R. 591).

Consequently, the Court should view the State as it would any
other commercial litigant and should not shy away from estopping
the state where justice demands it.
In Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697, the Court set

forth the

elements of estoppel:
Estoppel arises when a party . . . by his
acts, representations, or admissions, or by
his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable negligence,
induces another . . .
to believe certain
facts to exist and that such other . . .
acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that he
will suffer an injustice if the former . . .
is permitted to deny the existence of such
facts.
The District

Court

found that during

1978, prior to

mining the State Lease, employees of Consol contacted Division
employees, including the Assistant Director, to inquire as to the
royalty rate.

Consol was told that because of the ambiguity in

the royalty rate, it could not commence mining until an agreement
was reached as to the proper rate.

An agreement was subsequently

reached that the royalty rate would be 15 cents per ton, the same
rate then being paid by Consol under the adjacent Federal Lease
held by Consol.
until

1981.

Consol did not begin mining

Prior

to

commencing

mining,

the State Lease
Consol

employees

attempted to confirm the royalty rate by contacting the Division,
which then informed Consol that the royalty rate would be 17^
cents per ton, which was the rate Consol was then paying under
-22-

its Federal Lease.

In reliance on this agreement, Consol pro-

ceeded to mine coal under the State Lease.

During the entire

Audit
at nh

cents per ton

provided by the State, without

any objection or comment , I: j the Stati
^ne

eour |::

uistrict

(R

jnciuaea

undisputed facts that Consol would sho%
mir
592).

5911 92)
c i i Il: e basis
substantial

ase at

IOSA.

in ii I I

hi I I y i nil i III..

Thus, had the Division timely informed Consol that

believed 8s

applicable royalty rate, Consol would have

Lease would not

have been mined;

received no royalty

lit

151-5?).

and the State

On

would have

basis of these fac 1: .s,

p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d I II! ill I lii 1 I'vl nil i" ni "• i stopped

th fi! 13

from demanding payment based on an 8% royalty.
3•

Evei i if the Stale A Lit1 J «t. _a Governmental Capac-

i t y , It i s S t i l l Estopped — Even if I he State acted 1 n a governII1. si ill estopped i I III «i basic elements • if

mental capacity,

it

i

i > III ni mi i l l

II II

iiiiiiiiiiiiiii ni II mi > III

othervise result, and if app 1 ication

ni i i i i 1 II in II

II II

C c ;:i i s :::! Ill

i> i :::}ii ill ::::!

estoppe 1 ii i i 1::,111:1: ,ii s ^ :::::a s€ '

would not have a substantial adverse impact > i:>ii public polici ^ ::3:i

P.2d at 718? Celebrity Club. 602 P.2d at 694

lllloving the State

to repudiate aii agreement and policy on which Consol relied *»**«

obtain a windfall at the expense of Consol

is clearly unjust.

Moreover, as the District Court noted,
The State can still proceed to lease coal
lands on any terms it feels profitable and
that will give the State the maximum return.
They still have the power to revise the
wording of their coal leases to do away with
any ambiguity and to carry out any legally
established policy.
(R. 592).

Under these facts, estopping the State does not raise

serious public policy concerns.
The State argues that to apply estoppel
would prohibit
audit process.

in this case

it from correcting any errors found through the
Brief of Appellants at 34-35.

This case, how-

ever, does not involve an "error" by the State or Consol.

The

State consciously adopted a policy with regard to the prevailing
rate clause.

Because the clause was ambiguous, the State chose

to enter into an agreement with Consol as to the proper royalty
rate.

The State is not attempting to correct an error; rather,

it is attempting to retroactively apply a new policy with regard
to the prevailing federal rate clause.

However, the public has

the right to expect that an agency will adhere to its policies
until new policies are announced, and that when prior policies
have been relied upon, new policies will not be applied retroactively to the detriment of the relying parties.

This fundamental

principle was applied in Continental Oil Co. v. United States,
184 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1950), where the court concluded that a
new

royalty

policy

such

as

that
-24-

involved

here

could

not

be

appllll 11 ill 1 e l in

ii I i in I |„i

il in in il li in in mi i i

il I i II I in in in il mi ill ' I ill i1 >n I in in "I h in mi la-

ment of the Interior adopted a nev policy affecting oil and gas
lease royalty calculations that conflicted with its pr

oolicy.

ppiy zi

1 It attempt*

payments that were outstanding because

separate dispute

between I IIIIII Department and its lessees

summarily

dismissed the Department's contention that such a policy cioulcil IIP
applied retroactively:
£S
f o r tjje government's claim that the
Secretary might recompute the gas royalties
owing where lessees had not paid the bills
previously rendered, in other words, make his
June 7, 1937 order retroactive, we think the
[trial] court correctly construed the provision of the lease permitting the Secretary to
fix the value of gas for royalty purposes as
operating prospectively only. Statutes are
always so construed. We think that a contract provision as extraordinary as is the
authorization t o f:i x values, should no less
be interpreted as having prospective operation only.
Id.

a

*

itation omitted).

The State

?

« Prt

tterer

a

position than the federal government was in Continental Oil.
c'lFiiiiiiiiiii •, I1,

afte<r

ton as 1 lie1

applicable royalty rate under

State Lease, change

that policy retroactively to the • detrimer .1: of Consol.
F.

The Status of the Lands 'Covered by the
State Lease Does Not Change the Agreement Between the Parties or Preclude
Estoppel Against the State

'The State contends that the status of the lands covered
by the State Lease as school trust lands allows it to repudiate
.25.

firmly
relied.

established

agreements

and

policies

on

which

Consol

However, there is nothing illegal or improper about the

State's past agreements and policies with regard to these lands.
The Utah Enabling Act, the Utah Constitution and the applicable
Utah statutes grant the Board and Division broad discretion in
establishing

royalty

rates

for coal mined

including school lands trust lands.

from state lands,

See Utah Enabling Act, § 10

(proceeds of lands granted for educational purposes shall constitute a permanent school fund); Utah Const, art. X, S 5 (proceeds
from school lands to be used in accordance with congressional
grants); id.; art. XX, S 1 (school lands to be disposed of as may
be provided by law); Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-23 (Board to prescribe
rules and regulations prescribing amount of royalty and basis for
calculation) (repealed July 1, 1988); id. S 65-1-18 (Division to
issue leases under terms prescribed by Board) (repealed July 1,
1988).

Thus, the applicable Utah laws do not mandate that the

State receive more than nh

cents per ton.

In granting the State

broad discretion in establishing royalty rates, the applicable
laws differ from the laws of certain other states which specifically limit the discretion of government officials in establishing the value to be received from trust lands.

See Kadish v.

Arizona State Land Dept., 155 Ariz. 484, 747 P.2d 1183, 1186
(Ariz. 1987), cert, granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (1988) Oklahoma
Education Ass'n v. Nigh., 642 P.2d 230,234 (Okla. 1982); County
of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127, 685 P.2d 526, 573 (1984).
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In establishing the royalty rate
initially, ana xn subsequent I i .mil IIT IJIII I

15 cents per ton
i. i r>yalty rate of 17%

cents per ton, the State acted within its discretionar
cumstance?

enforcing the agreement between

parties or estopping

rote to

LUC detriment of its lessee is

contrary to public policy

Spratlinq w. State Lai id Board-

in

2d 342, 437 P 2d 886, 888

(1968), the Court held that tne state co u] d i lot i ej i»1 *r '••' a
cont

granting a mineral interes

school trust lands simply

because the school

imilarly, the State

cannot repudiate its agreemen

,th Conso

tenalize Consol, w***w. dealt with the Stat*
faith.
The State argues that Utah ' —

requires the receipi

disposition
cites a number of cases
Utah v, .- ,K

^

rev'd. 446 i

Enabling

Kleppe, however,

State 1 s asser

offers no support

State involve different enabling acts, some of which
value t M hr received

contain specif
from school trust lands.
c (iUi

it

proposn
56 (lOt

509 (198f
cited

lands

fill I

do here:

See supra

urthei

>

I he blalt sanction what the State is attempt

extract

m

repudiating

agreement and policy upon which Consol relied.
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11.
an

Moreover, even if the State's discretion under Utah law
was limited in the sense that it had an implied duty of prudence
when disposing of school trust assets, the facts show that both
the State satisfied this duty.

Indeed, as noted above, if the

State had sought an increase from the 17h cent rate, the Lease
could not have been mined economically by Consol and the State
would have received no royalties at all.
Finally, the cases cited by the State dealing with
estoppel do not stand for the proposition that the State can
never be estopped when

leasing school trust

lands.

On the

contrary, the decisions in these cases were closely tied to their
specific facts.

See State ex rel Commr's of Land Office v.

Phillips Petroleum, 258 P.2d 1193, 1199-1200 (Okla. 1953); State
v. Northwest Maqnesite Co., 28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P.2d 643, 656-58
(1947); Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948,
956-57 (Mont. 1985).

These cases are not dispositive here, where

a balancing test must be applied to the specific facts.
G.

The State's New Royalty Policy is a Rule
which is Invalid Because of the State's
Failure to Follow the Provisions of the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

Under the provisions of the 1985 Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, which was in effect when the State announced its
new royalty policy, Utah agencies that adopt new rules must follow the procedures specified

in that Act.
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Utah Code Ann.

S 63-46a-3 (1986) (amended 1987 and 1988).

The Act defined a

rule as:
a statement made by an agency that applies to
a general class of persons, rather than specific persons and: (i) implements or interprets policy made by statute; or (ii) prescribes the policy of the agency in the
absence of express statutory policy. . . .
Id. S 63-46a-2 (8)(a) (current version, as amended in 1987 and
1988 provides that rule "applies to a class of persons or an
agency11).

The State's new royalty policy requiring an 8% royalty

rate under all of the leases having royalty provisions similar to
that contained in the State Lease is a rule within the meaning of
this statute.

Therefore, it cannot be adopted either prospec-

tively or retrospectively without compliance with the rulemaking
procedures of the statute.
In Williams v. Public Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court applied the provisions of an
earlier version of the Rulemaking Act to a Public Service Commission decision that it had no jurisdiction to regulate one-way
mobile telephone paging services.

In that case, the Commission

had since at least 1962 purported to regulate one-way paging
services by issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity to at least four applicants and denying requests for certificates of authority to others.

However, in 1983, the Commission

reversed itself and announced, without engaging in a rulemaking

-29-

proceeding, that it had no jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services.
In

considering

the

validity

of

that

ruling,

the

Williams Court acknowledged that in some circumstances an agency
may announce new policy in informal adjudications, but observed
that this procedure is not allowed where the agency is fundamentally

altering

a prior

affected parties.

policy

that

had

been

relied

upon

by

The Court concluded that when a policy makes a

"change in clear law" the agency

is engaged

in rulemaking

and

ruled that:
Under all these circumstances, we conclude
that the Commission cannot reverse its longsettled position regarding the scope of its
jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy change without following the requirements
of the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act.
Id. at 776-77.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned

that because the new policy of the Commission affected the four
holders of certificates authorizing one-way paging services, it
was a statement of "general applicability" and therefore a rule
within the meaning of the Rulemaking Act in effect at the time
the Commission issued its ruling,

id. at 776.

The definition of

"rule" was revised in 1985; at the time Williams was decided, the
statute provided that a rule is a statement

that applies to a

"general class of persons rather than specific persons"; however,
the Court observed

that

its conclusion would not be different

-30-

were it to analyze the matter under the latter statute.

Id. at

775 n.7.
Under the rationale of the Williams case, the State's
new royalty policy announced in October of 1985 was a rule,
vhich, absent compliance with the procedures of the Rulemaking
Act, is invalid and may not be applied prospectively, much less
retrospectively.

As with the policy considered in the Williams

case, the royalty policy, vhich affects all lessees having leases
containing the royalty provision at issue here, affects a "class
of persons."

The policy prescribes the policy of the agency and

it represents a clear departure from the prior practice of the
agency.

Under these circumstances, the State should not be

allowed to enforce its policy, either prospectively or retrospectively, until it complies with the Rulemaking Act.
H.

The District Court Properly Found that
the State May Not Apply its Interest
Rule to the State Lease.

In the event that this case is remanded and it is found
that Consol owes the State any additional royalties, it must be
determined what, if any, interest is owed.

The Court should

therefore rule on the following issues only if it remands the
case for a determination of the "prevailing federal rate."

-31-

1.

Pursuant to the Express Terms of the State Lease,

the State May Not Impose the Terms of the November, 1982 Interest
Rule on Any Royalty Payment Deficiencies Should Such Deficiencies
be Found to Exist —

The State has demanded accrued interest on

the allegedly past-due royalties through the date of the audit in
the amount of $70,211.21. This amount represents interest at the
statutory rate of 6% for the period from July, 1979 through June,
1981; at the statutory rate of 10% for the period from July, 1981
through November, 1982 and at the regulatory rate of 18%, based
upon a rule adopted by the Board on November 4, 1982, for the
period from December, 1982 through December, 1984. The State has
also demanded additional accrued interest after the date of the
audit.
Article I of the State Lease provides:

"This lease is

granted subject in all respects to and under the conditions of
. . . existing rules and regulations and such operating rules and
regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State
Land Board" (emphasis added).

All mineral leases issued by the

Board prior to 1967 are subject to the conditions and provisions
contained in the leases.
1988).

Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-96

Thus, the State Lease

is only subject

(repealed

to rules and

regulations existing as of March 15, 1965 (the date of the State
Lease) and "operating" rules and regulations adopted thereafter
by the Board.
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The Board had no rule or regulation regarding interest
vhen the State Lease was issued.

Thus, there is no regulation

regarding interest which can be applied to this lease.

Further-

more, the District Court properly concluded that the Board's 1982
interest rule cannot be applied to this lease, because it cannot
be characterized as an "operating" rule (R. 593).
1982 interest

The Board's

rule is not a rule that governs the lessee's

actions or operations on the land within the ordinary meaning of
"operating."

If the interest rule is an "operating" rule or

regulation, it is difficult to envision which of the Board's
rules or regulations are "non-operating" and why the Board chose
to make a distinction between operating and non-operating rules
and regulations in drafting the State Lease.

The authority to

impose new "operating" rules and regulations on lessees provides
the Board with the opportunity to regulate mining activities on
leased lands that might adversely affect the state's mineral
reserves, the public health and safety or the environment.

The

1982 interest rule clearly does not fall within the ambit of this
retention of authority.

Thus, it cannot be applied to any

royalty deficiencies which may be due under the State Lease.
2.

The State

is Not Entitled

to

Interest

on Any

Alleged Royalty Payment Deficiencies for Periods of Time Prior to
the State's First Demand for Payment of the Alleged Deficiencies.
No interest charge, whether based on statute or regulation, may
accrue in this case until a demand is made for the principal.
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This rule was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Staker v.
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188f 1191 (Utah
1983), which involved a claim for overpayments made by mistake to
an irrigation company.

The Court ruled that the prejudgment

interest award should only run from the date that the plaintiff
demanded the return of the overpayment and not from the date that
the overpayment was made.

Accordingly, since the Division did

not make a demand for alleged royalty underpayments until October
15, 1985, it has no right to interest, if any, until after the
date of the demand.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
STATE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The

District

Court

denied

the

State's

Motion

for

Partial Summary Judgment (R. 593), in which the State requested
the court to find as a matter of law that 8% of gross sales value
was the applicable royalty under the prevailing federal rate
clause of the State Lease from 1979 through the end of the lease
term in January, 1988 (R. 450).

The District Court's decision

was proper because the Record shows there were material facts in
dispute necessary to the State's motion.
failed

to assert

necessary

facts

Furthermore, the State

in support

of

its Motion,

including support for its assertion that the prevailing federal
royalty rate was 8%.
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A.

Consol Raised Specific Issues Shoving
that there are Genuine Issues for Trial.

The Record does not support a summary judgment in favor
of the State because there are genuine issues of material fact.
Foremost among the material facts asserted by the State vhich
Consol controverted is the following:

The State asserted that

the "federal royalty rate on leases issued since 1979 in Utah has
been the same regardless of location, quality of coal, etc" (R.
338).

The State's ovn authority controverts this assertion and

shovs that such royalty rates ranged from 5% to 12.5% (R. 469).
Furthermore, the State's assertion assumes that a change in the
royalty rate pursuant to the prevailing federal rate clause is to
be based only on nevlv issued leases.

This interpretation does

not comport vith a plain reading of the prevailing federal rate
clause vhich instead indicates that the rate is to be based on
federal coal leases in effect at the beginning of the quarter.
See infra, pp. 37-38.

The royalty rates for federal coal leases

in effect during the Audit Period ranged from ten cents per ton
to 12.5% of value in Utah and across the nation (R. 469).
B.

The State Failed to Assert Facts in
Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Among the material facts vhich the State failed to
assert in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are
the following:

1.
Exhibit

Facts establishing that the leases referred to in

1 to the Affidavit of Robert Lopez

(attached as an

exhibit to the State's Summary Judgment Memorandum) (R. 401) are
for "land of similar character" or are otherwise relevant to the
prevailing federal rate clause.
2.

Facts establishing

that 8% was the "prevailing

rate" for "coal leases issued by the United States,"
3.

Facts

establishing

that

the prevailing

federal

rate clause only pertains to newly issued federal coal leases.
4.

Facts establishing that 8% was the prevailing rate

for federal coal leases for land of a similar character in effect
at the beginning of each quarter of the Audit Period and applicable quarters thereafter until the end of the lease term.
In sum, because Consol raised genuine issues of material fact and because the State did not establish facts supporting its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the District Court
properly denied the State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
C.

It Cannot Be Said that the Prevailing
Federal Royalty Rate During the Audit
Period Was 8%.

The

State

argues

that

the meaning

of

the

royalty

provision is clear and that the prevailing federal rate clause
requires payment of royalties at the rate of the majority of the
federal
According

coal

leases

newly

issued

during

the

Audit

Period.

to the State, under the FCLAA and the regulations
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promulgated thereunder, the prevailing rate for all underground
p

federal coal leases after 1976 was 8% of the coal value.

The

State also claims that the majority of such leases was issued at
the royalty rate of 8%, and that therefore the royalty rate
payable under the royalty provision was 8%.
Contrary to the State's position, the wording of the
prevailing federal rate clause does not indicate that it refers
only to nevly issued leases, and the State offers no authority

8

The contention that the federal law requires an 8% royalty
rate for all underground federal coal leases is based upon a misreading of the regulation upon which the State relies. That regulation provides:
A lease shall require payment of a royalty
rate of not less than 8 percentum of the
value of the coal removed from an underground
mine, except that the authorized officer may
determine a lesser amount, but in no case
less than 5 percent if conditions warrant.
43 C.F.R. S 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1986). This regulation does not, as
the State contends, provide for an 8% royalty rate on all underground federal coal leases. Rather, it requires the Department
of the Interior to consider whether a rate of between 5% and 8%
should be imposed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
recently ruled that this is the clear meaning of the regulation
in Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel. 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir.
1987).
In that case, the court considered the Department of
Interior's assertion that upon the 20-year readjustment of
federal coal leases, the provisions of the regulation require the
imposition of an 8% rate. The court rejected this assertion out
of hand and ruled that the regulation does not "automatically
fix" a royalty rate of 8% for all underground coal leases, but
rather the Department is required to consider royalty rates in
the range of 5% to 8%. id. at 507. Thus, even if the State
could apply its new royalty policy retroactively, that policy
would be invalid because it is based upon a misunderstanding of
the federal law regarding underground royalty rates.
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for such an interpretation.

In addition, the clause does not

refer to leases issued during the quarter but rather to leases
issued "at the beginning of the quarter," which could mean that
it refers to all leases
quarter.

issued before

the beginning

of the

Consideration of all federal leases that were in effect

during the reporting quarter would certainly comport with a plain
reading of the clause and would result in a practical application
of the clause.
The State's interpretation that the clause refers only
to newly issued leases issued in Utah during the reporting period
is also nonsensical.

Application of this interpretation would

result in a royalty rate payable under the lease of 17% cents per
ton for some reporting quarters when no new federal leases were
issued,
issued.

but

8%

for other quarters when

federal

leases were

Specifically, as set forth in Appendix XV to Consol's

Reply Memorandum (R. 562), Consol was in production during five
of the twenty-two quarters during the Audit Period.

There were

newly issued leases during four of the five producing quarters.
Thus, application of the State's interpretation of the royalty
provision would result in a royalty rate of 8% for four quarters
and 15 cents per ton for one quarter.
The

State

has

not

established

uncontroverted

facts

showing that 8% was the prevailing rate for federal coal leases
of land of similar character in effect from 1979 through 1988.
The underground royalty rates for such leases varied between 10
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cents per ton and 12.5% of value (R. 469).

A trial would be

necessary to determine the prevailing rate for coal leases of
land of similar character 1979 through 1988.
III. AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
REVIEW IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
In the section of

its Brief entitled

OF
"Standard of

Review," the State asserts that the Director's decision should
not be overturned unless it is found to be arbitrary or capricious.

The State admits that under Adkins v. Division of State

Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1986), the hearings held before the
Board and its determination are deemed to be nullities and this
case must be viewed as a review of the Director's decision, which
is embodied

in the

Royalty

Audit

Report

(R.

517) and

the

Director's February 5, 1986 response to Consol's November 12,
1985 protest of that report (R. 559).
In this context, no deference should be accorded the
Director's decision.

That decision was reached before any hear-

ings or evidentiary and legal submissions were made to the Board.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that where, as here, there is no
record for the court to review, other than a protest and the
agency's decision, and a complete airing of the issues and facts
was not had before the agency, the court must conduct an independent inquiry and may not simply defer to the agency's naked decision.

Denver t Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Central Weber

Sewer Improvement Dist.. 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (1955).
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Moreover, this case
struction

and

statutory

involves

interpretation

issues of contract conand

the application

of

equitable principles, areas in which courts do not accord agencies any deference.

Because these issues are wholly outside the

Director's expertise, the Court must make

its own "independent

determination of the correct application of the governing principles."

Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S.

263, 270 (1960); see also Adjcins, 719 P.2d at 526 (on questions
of statutory
deference

is

construction
accorded

involving pure questions of

agency

determination).

The

law, no

Directors

decision turned on issues as to which the Division has no expertise, was based on the most superficial of
made

by

an

interested

decisionmaker.

party,

rather

inquiries, and was
than

an

impartial

Accordingly, it is not entitled to deference from

the Court.
CONCLUSION
The State's claims constitute unconscionable overreaching on its part.
ambiguous.

The lease language which it drafted is patently

The State itself considered the language to be ambig-

uous and thus would not permit mining to commence until a royalty
rate agreement was reached.
complied with its terms.

An agreement was reached.

Consol

Coal subject to the State Lease was of

marginal quality and could not be mined at a royalty rate higher
than the one agreed upon.

That rate was at the same level as the

rate for the only federal lease under the mining plan.
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Had the

State demanded a higher rate before mining began, three things
vould have happened;

1) the State Lease would have been deleted

from the mining plan; 2) Consol vould have produced the same
amount of coal from other contiguous coal lands; and 3) the State
vould have received no royalties vhatsoever,
Consolvs case is the only case of the four consolidated
cases vhere an agreement vas reached vith the State on the prevailing federal rate.

The State cannot unilaterally revise the

agreement to increase the royalty rate to 8%.

Furthermore, the

State is estopped from denying the existence of the agreement and
from asserting that the royalty rate vas anything other than

nh

cents per ton.
The District Court's judgment applied retroactively to
the Audit Period and prospectively from the date of the audit on
October 15, 1985 until the date of readjustment of the State
Lease on January 23, 1988.

The District Court's judgment vas

prospective because the court found that the parties reached an
agreement that the royalty rate vas 17% cents per ton at least
until the end of the twenty-year term of the State Lease on January 23, 1988, vhen it vould be subject to readjustment.

Further,

the District Court concluded that the prevailing federal rate
clause "is not self-executing as to create a legal obligation on
the

lessee

since

the

identifiable

factors

necessary

for

self-execution could not independently be ascertained by either
party" (R. 590)).

Moreover, the State has not conducted a proper
.11.

rulemaking proceeding to change the royalty rate.

Thus, the

State is precluded from recovering royalty payments of more than
17*s cents per ton prior to the end of the twenty year term on
January 23, 1988.
The findings and the judgment of the District Court are
supported by the Record and should thus be upheld by the Court.
If the Court finds that a royalty other than 17*s cents per ton
was required to be paid by Consol, this case should be remanded
to the District Court for factual findings on the rovalty rate.
DATED this jWl^dav

of November, 1988.
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day of November, 1988:

APPENDIX A
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS OF THE STATE
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
Appellants1 Brief at 4: "The United States Government owns
most of the coal-producing lands within the State of Utah."
Appellants9 Brief at 5: "When State Lease no. 22729 was
issued by the State, the royalty rate on many federal coal
leases was $.15 per ton."
Appellants9 Brief at 7: "The lands that the Division of
State Lands manages have thousands of mineral leases.99
Appellants9 Brief at 7:
"Instead the State of Utah, as
written in its lease provisions and regulations, requires
its lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the
correct amounts of royalties. Like reporting taxes, it has
largely been a honor reporting system."
Appellants9 Brief at 10: "The State has a . . . moral duty
to obtain full value from the disposition of those lands."
Appellants9 Brief at 17-18: "The market royalty rate on
coal leases, in the state of Utah, is controlled by the
United States which has the vast majority of coal reserves.
Lessees require long-term leases because of the capital
expenditures involved."
Appellants9 Brief at 18: "The State therefore, drafted an
escalator clause in its coal lease which tied the royalty
revision to the prevailing federal rate.
That escalator
clause insured that the State would, throughout the term of
the lease, receive full market value."
Appellants9 Brief at 19: " . . . with an ongoing loss of
more than $2.00 per ton for coal produced after the audit."
Appellants9 Brief at 20: *A reading of the royalty provision in the lease (Article III Second) shows that it is
clear and complies with the intent of the parties that the
trust lands receive the going royalty rate. It states that
the royalty rate will be $.15 per .ton (which was the federal
rate when the lease was signed). . ."
Appellants9 Brief at 21: "Plaintiffs had the duty to determine any change in the federal royalty rate."
Appellants9 Brief at 21: "The federal government owns the
majority of coal reserves in Utah."

Appellants1 Brief at 22: "Plaintiffs hold numerous federal
leases in Utah, part of which require an 8% royalty."
Appellants' Brief at 22: "The Plaintiffs . . . concede that
the federal rate is higher than the royalty payment they
paid prior to 1976."
Appellants1 Brief at 24: "The Federal Government owns the
majority of coal reserves in the State of Utah; therefore,
the royalty rate charged by the Federal Government constitutes the prevailing market rate in the State of Utah. At
the time the lease provision was drafted the federal royalty
rate was generally $.15 per ton."
Appellants' Brief at 24: "The escalator clause was required
by law and the obvious intent of the parties, when the contract was entered into, was to provide a mechanism whereby
the State would always receive the going market royalty rate
from its trust lands."
Appellants' Brief at 25: "One of the things that is certain
about the royalty provision, in addition to the plain meaning of Subsection b, is that the contracting parties
intended that the royalty rate would change if federal royalty rates increased."
Appellants' Brief at 26: "They [Consol] have conceded that
the rate has increased and subparagraph (b) applies."
Appellants' Brief at 26: In this particular case the undisputed facts establish that the prevailing federal rate is 8%
of value which is the rate Plaintiffs pay to the federal
government on most of its other leases. Any changes in the
rate can be easily determined by review of Bureau of Land
Management records."
Appellants' Brief at 34: "Indeed, the undisputed facts show
that it was the State that relied on the Plaintiffs to pay
the correct royalty amount. The Plaintiffs had the duty to
the State to calculate and pay the correct royalty. Plaintiffs concede they are liable for failure to report all
their production of the lease.
The State did not have a
duty to Plaintiffs to collect the correct royalty although
it has such a duty to the school trust."
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APPENDIX B
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF
THE STATE LEASE ROYALTY PROVISION
Royalty Provision
Language:

To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the
15th day of the month succeeding each quarter , royalty
(a)

at the rate of 15* per ton of 2000
lbs. of coal produced for the
leased premises and sold or othervise disposed of, or

(b)

at the rate prevailing, at the
beginning of the quarter for which
payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,

whichever is higher .
Ambiguous
Phrase
'at the rate prevailing1

Different
Interpretations
1.
2.
3.

"federal lessees of land
• . under coal
leases"

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
B.
9.

the rate of the majority
of leases
an average of rates
the highest rate
all federal coal leases
in the nation
federal coal leases in
the West
federal coal leases in
Utah
federal coal leases in
the same region
federal coal leases in
the same county
federal coal leases in
the same drainage area
federal coal leases in
the same mine
producing federal coal
leases
non-producing
federal
coal leases

"land of similar character"

Land with:
1.
similar
geological
or
physical characteristics
2.
similar access characteristics
3.
similar degree of development completed
4.
coal with similar fuel
utilization potential
5.
similar environmental or
regulatory restrictions
6.
similar
labor
force
availability

"coal leases issued by the
United States at that time"

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

313:110788A
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all federal coal leases
in effect on the date of
the
beginning
of
the
reporting quarter
all federal coal leases
in
effect
during
the
reporting quarter
all federal coal leases
in
effect
during
the
Audit Period
federal coal leases newly
issued on the date of the
beginning of the reporting quarter
federal coal leases newly
issued during the reporting quarter
federal coal leases newly
issued during the Audit
Period

